Post by NewsHound on May 13, 2005 21:54:27 GMT -4
In the words of Corrado and Markwart (1992) ‘Moral panic is the ability of the media to create fear among the public by presenting images of rampant and ever-escalating juvenile crime, even though it is not necessarily substantiated by official statistics’ (p. 160). It is this ability the media possesses which has ‘brain washed’ the public into believing that youth crime is a phenomenon out of control and that the public is unable to protect itself. And since juvenile delinquency is so rampant violent young offenders are virtually multiplying by the minute thanks to a ‘soft’ YOA. In addition, Corrado and Markwart (1992: 160) discuss how The Canadian Sentencing Commission found that the public believes crime rates are higher than they are; overestimates the degree of recidivism of offenders; yet underestimates the maximum sentencing prescribed penalties and the actual sentencing penalties. It was no surprise that the Commission also discovered that the public got 95% of its information sources from the news media.
With regards to the ‘moral panic’ the media has created in the public, getting tough on youth crime with specific deterrence is not the answer to our worries regarding youth crime in our society. As Siegal clarifies for us (1995) ‘ Specific deterrence theory holds that the crime rate can be reduced if known offenders are punished so severely that they never commit crimes again’ (130). Well it would be comforting if specific deterrence actually worked, but there is virtually no evidence that harsh punishments reduce the crime rate. And even if harsh punishments were the case in our criminal justice system the majority of known criminals and youths are not ‘cured’ by their punishments. It would be a perfect world if we could scare an individual out of committing a deviant act but in 1997 that doesn’t seem to be a viable option at the moment because some people just aren’t afraid to do the time.
Speaking of ‘doing time’ (incarceration), Siegal (1995: 128) chronicles that it stands to reason if more criminals are locked, up the crime rate should go down and offenders will age out of crime because their ‘prime crime’ years should lessen along with their lifetime opportunity to commit crime. The less opportunity to commit crime, the fewer the number off offenses an offender can commit over his or her life course; hence, crime is reduced. This is definitely wishful thinking if it is to be seen as a solution to youth crime regarding the incapacitation standpoint. As Siegal (1995: 128) points out, with over 1.4 million Americans incarcerated in prisons and jails in the United States alone, there has been little reduction in the overall crime rate in the U.S. In fact, as the prison populations swell in this effort to combat crime, so have the violent crime rates in the U.S. So it seems that it would be wise to learn from the Americans in this instance because as Siegal(1995) points out ‘research on the benefits of incapacitation has not shown that increasing the number of people behind bars or the length of their stay can effectively reduce crime’ (p. 128).
Although getting tough on youth crime in the form of specific deterrence, and incapacitation are not the answers to youth crime, transfer to the adult system is perhaps the most cold hearted thing we could do to our troubled youths. In the criminal justice system Bala (1993: 31) depicts transfer to the adult system as the most serious thing that can happen to a young offender charged with a serious offense. An individual selected to be transferred to the adult system is often evaluated as to the probability if the of whether or not the youth will be rehabilitated within the three year period prescribed as the maximum YOA disposition. If that individual is evaluated as not likely to be rehabilitated in the three year period, a transfer often occurs in which the youth could be faced with a life sentence under certain charges, such as murder in the adult system. Inevitably the solution which Bala (1993: 33) suggests is the essence of what should be the future of the YOA. Judges acting under the YOA should be able to impose sentences of longer than three years, noting that for disturbed youths it may be necessary to have sentences of five to ten years in secure settings which involve greater counseling and consideration than a mere bump up to the adult system would involve. Society would be better served if the maximum sentence under the YOA was increased because young offenders would be able to partake in a lengthened rehabilitation period and hopefully get on with a fulfilling legal life after they are rehabilitated.
Coupled with a longer rehabilitation period for troubled youths and a narrower set of legal rules, perhaps this could be a solution to youth crime. Singer (1996) offers some clarification by inferring ‘ a combination of legislative and judicial waiver procedures might provide the mix of administrative rules that would maintain the principle of offense and at the same time provide criminal justice officials the ability to track serious violent delinquents’ (p.193). As Singer (1996: 193) describes, legislative waiver has the advantage of being offense-based and of preventing juveniles from entering criminal court for nonviolent offenses. Thus by restricting legislative waiver to murder, the juvenile justice and criminal justice systems are spared the burden of dealing with less serious designated criminal offenses. As for youth who rape and rob, as Singer (1996: 194) points out, it would seem more feasible to begin tracking their violent behavior in youth courts so that when they appear in the adult courts it is not a first time offense. In hindsight, Singer concludes that a combination of legislative and judicial waiver should set limits as to the kinds of offenses for which juveniles would enter into the criminal courts. At the same time, a tightly coupled system of juvenile and adult criminal justice would require that criminal court officials be aware of an adult’s earlier juvenile court convictions for violent designated felonies, such as rape, robbery, murder etc.
With regards to the ‘moral panic’ the media has created in the public, getting tough on youth crime with specific deterrence is not the answer to our worries regarding youth crime in our society. As Siegal clarifies for us (1995) ‘ Specific deterrence theory holds that the crime rate can be reduced if known offenders are punished so severely that they never commit crimes again’ (130). Well it would be comforting if specific deterrence actually worked, but there is virtually no evidence that harsh punishments reduce the crime rate. And even if harsh punishments were the case in our criminal justice system the majority of known criminals and youths are not ‘cured’ by their punishments. It would be a perfect world if we could scare an individual out of committing a deviant act but in 1997 that doesn’t seem to be a viable option at the moment because some people just aren’t afraid to do the time.
Speaking of ‘doing time’ (incarceration), Siegal (1995: 128) chronicles that it stands to reason if more criminals are locked, up the crime rate should go down and offenders will age out of crime because their ‘prime crime’ years should lessen along with their lifetime opportunity to commit crime. The less opportunity to commit crime, the fewer the number off offenses an offender can commit over his or her life course; hence, crime is reduced. This is definitely wishful thinking if it is to be seen as a solution to youth crime regarding the incapacitation standpoint. As Siegal (1995: 128) points out, with over 1.4 million Americans incarcerated in prisons and jails in the United States alone, there has been little reduction in the overall crime rate in the U.S. In fact, as the prison populations swell in this effort to combat crime, so have the violent crime rates in the U.S. So it seems that it would be wise to learn from the Americans in this instance because as Siegal(1995) points out ‘research on the benefits of incapacitation has not shown that increasing the number of people behind bars or the length of their stay can effectively reduce crime’ (p. 128).
Although getting tough on youth crime in the form of specific deterrence, and incapacitation are not the answers to youth crime, transfer to the adult system is perhaps the most cold hearted thing we could do to our troubled youths. In the criminal justice system Bala (1993: 31) depicts transfer to the adult system as the most serious thing that can happen to a young offender charged with a serious offense. An individual selected to be transferred to the adult system is often evaluated as to the probability if the of whether or not the youth will be rehabilitated within the three year period prescribed as the maximum YOA disposition. If that individual is evaluated as not likely to be rehabilitated in the three year period, a transfer often occurs in which the youth could be faced with a life sentence under certain charges, such as murder in the adult system. Inevitably the solution which Bala (1993: 33) suggests is the essence of what should be the future of the YOA. Judges acting under the YOA should be able to impose sentences of longer than three years, noting that for disturbed youths it may be necessary to have sentences of five to ten years in secure settings which involve greater counseling and consideration than a mere bump up to the adult system would involve. Society would be better served if the maximum sentence under the YOA was increased because young offenders would be able to partake in a lengthened rehabilitation period and hopefully get on with a fulfilling legal life after they are rehabilitated.
Coupled with a longer rehabilitation period for troubled youths and a narrower set of legal rules, perhaps this could be a solution to youth crime. Singer (1996) offers some clarification by inferring ‘ a combination of legislative and judicial waiver procedures might provide the mix of administrative rules that would maintain the principle of offense and at the same time provide criminal justice officials the ability to track serious violent delinquents’ (p.193). As Singer (1996: 193) describes, legislative waiver has the advantage of being offense-based and of preventing juveniles from entering criminal court for nonviolent offenses. Thus by restricting legislative waiver to murder, the juvenile justice and criminal justice systems are spared the burden of dealing with less serious designated criminal offenses. As for youth who rape and rob, as Singer (1996: 194) points out, it would seem more feasible to begin tracking their violent behavior in youth courts so that when they appear in the adult courts it is not a first time offense. In hindsight, Singer concludes that a combination of legislative and judicial waiver should set limits as to the kinds of offenses for which juveniles would enter into the criminal courts. At the same time, a tightly coupled system of juvenile and adult criminal justice would require that criminal court officials be aware of an adult’s earlier juvenile court convictions for violent designated felonies, such as rape, robbery, murder etc.